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Rights Trump Torture: How Dworkin’s System of
Rights Should Include a Right not to be Tortured and
Defeat Ticking Time-Bomb Scenario Type Arguments
Jennifer Eler
I. Introduction
Following the September 11 attacks and the war
on terrorism, torture, as a form of interrogation, reentered public consciousness. When commenting on
interrogational torture, one legal scholar, Alan
Dershowitz, discussed its inevitability and how
regulating its usage was superior to covertly practicing
it. He arrived at this conclusion by comparing three
values of democratic governments (and, presumably
its citizens): (1) safety and security of a nation’s
citizens; (2) preservation of civil liberties and human
rights; and (3) accountability and visibility in a
democracy. In times of conflict “the hard question is:
which value is to be preferred when an inevitable clash
occurs?”1 Preventing torture completely compromises
(1), while practicing it clandestinely violates (3).
Creating a “legal structure for limiting and controlling
torture” compromises our “principled opposition to
torture in all circumstances and create[s] a potentially
dangerous and expendable situation,” or, in other
words, it compromises value (3). 2 Because of torture’s
1

Alan Dershowitz, “Should the Ticking Bomb Terrorist be
Tortured? A Case Study in How a Democracy Should Make
Tragic Choices,” in Philosophy of Law, ed. Joel Feinberg and Jules
Coleman (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 502.
2
Ibid.
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inevitable nature, Dershowitz focuses on democratic
nations either secretly practicing it or regulating it and
then practicing it. By narrowing the options in this
way, the debate is really over how important (3) is in a
democratic society; Value (2) has already been
dismissed as a point of concern in the interrogational
torture dilemma. However, Dershowitz’s treatment of
rights, as equal in weight to concerns such as
democratic accountability and the safety and security
of a nation’s citizens, debases and disregards the
fundamental nature of rights. I want to argue that
rights are prior to concerns such as (3) and (1) and thus
should be weighted more heavily. If rights are prior in
this manner, torture must not be a viable interrogation
procedure.
In this paper, I want to explain how Dworkin’s
theory of rights adequately characterizes the
fundamental nature of rights and defeats utilitarian
calculus arguments, which feature prominently in
many ticking-time bomb scenario thought
experiments, in favor of interrogational torture.
Specifically, the right not to be tortured in
interrogational procedures needs to be included as a
concrete right derivable from Dworkin’s abstract right
to equal concern and respect. In Section II, I begin with
a brief discussion of torture and conclude that it is an
asymmetrical relationship between the dominator and
dominated that transforms the body of the dominated
individual into a medium of suffering that functions
completely against his/her will. This analysis is
necessary in order to distinguish torture from ordinary
punishment and reinforce its incompatibility with the
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abstract right to equal concern and respect. In Section
III, I explain Dworkin’s system of abstract and concrete
rights. In Section IV, I show how a utilitarian ethic
needs to include the right to equal concern and respect
to avoid dangerous and undesirable consequences. I
also explain how the ticking time bomb scenario, one
of the lingering arguments for allowing interrogational
torture, is defeated due to its classification as a
utilitarian argument of policy. Finally, in Section V, I
argue that the right not to be tortured ought to be
included as a concrete right derived from Dworkin’s
abstract right to equal concern and respect.
II. Defining Torture
To define torture, I want to begin at the most
rudimentary definition and add qualifiers until the
definition is adequate in explaining how torture
violates Dworkin’s right to equal concern and respect,
which will be discussed in a later section. At a very
basic level, Michael Davis defines torture as
“fundamentally… [a] relation between sentient beings
(torturer and tortured) in which the one makes the
other suffer.”3 However, this conception of torture
faces scope issues. How much suffering should count
as torture? If one argues “suffering” broadly (any
suffering counts as torture) then mere annoyance is
torture. This is often how torture is used in more
informal contexts. For example, I tell my friend
someone has a crush on her and refuse to divulge his
3

Michael Davis, “Torture and the Inhumane,” Criminal Justice
Ethics 26 (2007): 31.
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identity. After my incessant teasing, she might yell in
agony, “Please stop torturing me like this!”
David Sussman provides a better rudimentary
definition that resolves this scope issue. To him,
torture “involves the deliberate infliction of great pain
or some other intensely distressing affective state (fear,
shame, disgust, and so forth) on an unwilling person
for purposes that person does not and could not
reasonably be expected to share.”4 Already, a
profound lack of equal concern and respect is evident
in the relationship between torturer and tortured,
though the exact nature of this relationship is still
unclear. Sussman and Davis both agree that an
asymmetrical relationship exists between the torturer
and the tortured, in that the latter is completely
defenseless, while the former exercises complete
power over the situation. Davis characterizes the
torturer’s power as the ability to choose whom to
torture, when to discontinue the torture, and the
method of torture. The tortured, on the other hand,
only decides on a course of action that could lead to
him/her being tortured. Sussman conceives of the
defenseless tortured person as being fully aware of her
“inability to put up any real moral or legal resistance
to her tormentor.”5
At this point, it may be said that torture closely
resembles (legal) criminal punishment. Perhaps it is
the legal nature of criminal punishment that serves as
4

David Sussman, “What’s Wrong with Torture?” Philosophy and
Public Affairs 33 (2005):1-33.
5
Ibid.
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the distinguishing factor. However, this will not do.
Many pre and post-modern countries practice
legalized interrogational torture techniques. Soviet
interrogators utilized forced standing against Axis
POWs throughout World War II and continued to use
the Stalinist Conveyor system, of which forced
standing was a part, late into the 1950s. The British
produced similar documentation on forced standing
for its interrogators in 1956.6
Instead of legality serving as the distinguishing
factor between criminal punishment and torture, a
situation is judged to be torture based on a set of
criteria. Sussman outlines torture as containing four
essential features: (1) the pain is dispensed by another
person; (2) it serves some purpose or point of another;
(3) the victim lacks an escape mechanism (e.g. evasion,
retaliation, protection against attacks); and (4) the pain
serves to confuse and insult the victim's agency.
7Darius Rejali qualifies (2) to include pain dispensed
by “states or quasi-state officials and put towards
public purposes” in a systematic, calculated manner.8
The inclusion of (4) characterizes the experience the
tortured’s body ceasing to be his own and instead
being transformed into “a locus of suffering, as
something that is aware of itself as a body available to
and saturated by the active will of another.”9 In other
6

Darius Rejali, Torture and Democracy (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2007), 318-319.
7
Sussman.
8
Rejali, 562.
9
Sussman.

71

words, the tortured loses all agency concerning his
body since he can’t prevent the treatment he receives
and even more egregious, he questions “his [own]
ability to posses cares and commitments that are more
immediately and authentically his own than those of
another agent.”10 A torture victim’s autonomy is
inverted –instead of having the choice to express
feelings, desires and emotions – he expresses the
torturer’s will through expressions of unbearable pain.
Criteria (4) is one of the distinguishing factors
that separates torture from criminal punishment.
Sussman writes that “the violence of war or police
action may injure or insult an agent’s capacities for
rational and moral self governance but such violence
need not make the victim an accomplice in his own
violation.”11 Criminals in jail do not experience their
bodies as instrumental tools of suffering against
themselves. Though they are encouraged to change
their ways, they are not forced to suffer in order to
ensure that goal. Another distinguishing factor
between torture and criminal punishment is the
uncertain duration and intensity of treatment
experienced by the tortured. Jeremy Bentham writes
that “the quantity of Punishment, be it ever so great is
still determinate: it is determinate in intensity and
duration [whereas] the quantity of Torture is
indeterminate: it is determinate neither in intensity or

10
11

Ibid.
Ibid.
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duration.”12 Given this indeterminacy, Bentham argues
that it is easy to torture an innocent unknowingly if it
is used as an interrogational technique.13
So, our final broad definition for torture, based
largely on David Sussman’s conception, is an
asymmetrical relationship between the dominator and
dominated, which results in the dominator inducing
great pain or suffering on the dominated against his
will and not for his wellbeing. Specific instances of
torture, such as water-boarding, that are used in order
to obtain information raise other criterion that could be
added to our definition such as a governmental agency
or individual using a person purely for the means of
obtaining information and using methods of intense
pain in order to arrive at that goal. However, these
specific instances still share the definition’s overall
structure. The critical difference between criminal
punishment in general and torture is the loss and
inversion of autonomy suffered by torture victim
III. Dworkin’s Division of Rights
Dworkin also distinguishes abstract rights from
concrete rights.14 An abstract right is “a general
12

Jeremy Bentham, “Of Torture,” in The Phenomenon of Torture,
ed. William F. Schultz (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2007), 223.
13
Ibid.
14
In this paper, I am avoiding the exceedingly difficult issue of
conflicts between abstract rights and concrete rights and between
two concrete rights. Diana Meyers’ addresses the first issue in her
article entitled “Rights-based Rights.” She discusses a situation
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political aim the statement of which does not indicate
how that general aim is to be weighted or
compromised in particular circumstances against other
political aims.”15 Conversely, concrete rights are
“political aims that are more precisely defined so as to
express more definitely the weight they have against
other political aims on particular occasions.”16 The
difference between the two types of rights lies in their
applicability and whether they are enforced or not.
Abstract rights function as foundational rights that
apply generally “with no suggestions that these rights
are absolute [nor any] attempt to suggest [an] impact
on particular complex social situations.”17 They remain
un-individuated without reference to social situations
and serve to provide a general foundation for more
specific applications.18 For example, many rights are
based on right to equality which functions as an
abstract right. Concrete rights are derived from
abstract rights and are meant to be applied in specified
situations. For instance, a newspaper specifically has a
right to publish potentially damaging information
about a person provided that it is true (freedom of the

where the abstract right to equal concern and respect would
suspend the concrete right to freedom of the person. For more, see
Diana T. Meyers, “Rights-based Rights,” Philosophy and Law 3
(1984): 175-191.
15
Dworkin, 93.
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid.
18
It is helpful to think about Rawls’ three principles of justice as
examples of this type of abstract right.
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press). The claim of concrete rights is “more definitive
than any claim of abstract right that supports it.”19
Both abstract rights and concrete rights can
generate the type of claim-rights and liberty-rights
discussed in the previous sections. However, abstract
rights are rights that provide support for concrete
rights (which can function as either negative or
positive claim-rights) and are generally broad.
However, my focus here is on concrete rights as rights
in the strong sense where “some special grounds are
needed for justifying any interference.”20 Thus, when I
assert a negative concrete claim-right to publish a
newspaper article with potentially damaging, but true,
information this imposes a duty on others (especially
the government) to not interfere without justification.
This situational right is based on an abstract right to
free speech. If I use my abstract liberty right to bear
arms, this could generate a liberty right to purchase
guns in a rural American town. However, concerns of
this type are not my paper’s focus, but it does deserve
to be mentioned that abstract rights could be used in
this way.
One important abstract right that is incredibly
important is the right to equal concern and respect
which requires that certain “individual [concrete]
rights to distinct liberties”21 to be respected. Some
examples of these latter rights are those guaranteed by
the Constitution. The right to equal concern and
19

Ibid.
Dworkin, 188.
21
Dworkin,274.
20
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respect is defined as treating human beings as
“capable of suffering and…forming and acting on
intelligent conceptions of how their lives should be
lived.”22 This abstract right to equal concern and
respect generates certain concrete claim rights (both
negative and positive). However, equal concern and
respect can be interpreted in two different ways: the
right to treatment as an equal or the right to equal
treatment. The right to equal treatment is the “right to
an equal distribution of some opportunity or resource
or burden.”23 Conversely, the right to treatment as an
equal is the right “to be treated with the same respect
and concern as anyone else.”24 The profound
difference between these two rights is that one deals
with distributional equality of goods for individuals,
while the other deals with equal respect of individuals.
Equal respect of individuals is prior and does not
always entail equal treatment of individuals. Other
circumstances could affect the situation. For example, I
can still respect my friend and not give him an equal
slice of the pizza we ordered. I can give him onequarter of the pizza, while giving myself threequarters and still respect him because I know he ate
before arriving at my house. This example further
supports the claim that our focus should not be on
equal distribution. However, I am not respecting my
friend if I deny him pizza knowing that he is sitting
hungry and proceed to consume the entire pizza in
22

Dworkin, 272.
Dworkin, 227.
24
Ibid.
23
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front of him. In the first case, I am still respecting my
friend but not giving him an equal distribution of
goods while the second case shows that by not equally
distributing goods, I could profoundly disrespect my
friend.
To review, I have hitherto discussed the
distinctions between liberty and claim rights and
abstract and concrete rights. Claim-rights impose
correlative duties on others, whereas liberty rights
function as permission to refrain or perform certain
actions. Abstract rights are foundational rights that
function as principles to provide support for concrete
rights, which are attached to determinate situations.
The intersection between these different categories
occurs when Dworkin’s abstract right to equal concern
and respect generates certain concrete negative (or
positive) claim-rights. In the next section, I will discuss
how these individual, concrete rights serve as trumps
over utilitarian arguments of policy.
IV. Dworkin’s System of Rights as Trumps over
Utilitarian Concerns including the Ticking-Time
Bomb Scenario
Dworkin states that individual concrete rights
derived from the abstract right to equal concern and
respect serve as trumps over utilitarian arguments of
policy. Utilitarian arguments of policy proclaim that
“the community as a whole will be better off because
more of its citizens will have more of what they want
overall, even though some of them will have less.”25
25

Dworkin, 274.
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Dworkin argues that, prima facie, these types of
arguments appear to confirm the fundamental right of
equal concern and respect, but upon further
investigation, they violate it. This argument is worth
investigating as the most potent argument for torture –
the ticking time-bomb thought experiment—is based
on utilitarian premises.
To a utilitarian, people are treated as equals
when “the preferences of each, weighted only for
intensity are balanced in the same scales, with no
distinction for persons or merit.” In other words,
equality is achieved when no preferences are
discounted based on their content. Thus, personal
(how you wish your life to go, your goals) and external
(how you wish others lives to go and what you think
their goals should be) preferences are included in the
utilitarian calculus. Dworkin argues that many
external preferences are “corrupted.” so in order for
utilitarianism to correct for this, it needs to disentangle
personal from external preferences and only count
personal preferences. However, these two beliefs are
inextricably linked making disentanglement a useless
endeavor. The right to equal concern and respect and
other derivable rights are seen as a corrective force by
checking the power of external preferences on the
utilitarian calculus. “Rights are to prevail over utility
precisely because the whole point of setting them up is
to correct for the defects in the utilitarian arguments
which are likely to oppose them.”26
26

Jeremy Waldron, "Rights in Conflict," Ethics 99 (April, 1989):
516.
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Consider a community of homophobic persons,
who each argue that homosexuals’ preferences should
only count for half, while their own preferences should
count for 2 (with 1 being the weight everyone’s
preferences are supposed to be given). If enough
people believed this, then homosexuals would be
denied equal concern and respect not “on the
competition among personal preferences that abstract
statements of utilitarianism suggest,”27 but because of
the addition of an external preference (of homophobia)
to a personal preference. External preferences are a
person's views on how others should live their lives.
Their lives are deemed less important than a
heterosexual and their preferences, as the minority,
would only count for half.
If I want to argue that the right not to be
tortured should be included because it is a violation of
the abstract right to equal concern and respect, I must
address the relevancy of ticking-time bomb scenario
type arguments. If they function as utilitarian
arguments of policy (which I believe they do), then
they are immediately disqualified from consideration
in trumping rights. However, this type of argument
must be explained fully in order to understand both its
relation to utilitarianism and why it is so important to
undermine it.
William F. Schultz explains that “far more than
one philosopher, scholar or lawyer has argued the case
for torture in the context of interrogation” and that the
most “popular and persistent form of the debate
27

Dworkin, 275.
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focuses on the so-called ‘ticking time bomb
scenario.’”28 These scenarios contain two main
premises: (1) there is going to be some event that will
occur within a short amount of time which kills
hundreds of people; (2) the police have in custody a
person who, if tortured, will divulge information
necessary to prevent the event from occurring.29 In
these cases, if the person is tortured, the greater
community would be better off. Though this appears
to be an obvious point, the external preferences of
those affected (i.e. those who would be killed by the
event) argue that the terrorist/fanatic should be
tortured are balanced against the one
terrorist/fanatic’s personal preference to not be
tortured. This argument is designed to maximize
“general utility” which is calculated to “produce more
28

William F. Schultz, introduction to Chapter VI in The
Phenomenon of Torture (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2007), 219.
29
Numerous philosophers have constructed fanciful ticking timebomb scenarios. Michael Levin , one of the few scholars to publish
an essay on torture in a main-stream news media source
(Newsweek), imagines a terrorist who hid an atomic bomb on
Manhattan Island. The authorities capture him two hours before
the bomb is set to detonate and Levin asks whether we would
torture the terrorist. See Levin, Michael, “The Case for Torture,”
in The Phenomenon of Torture, ed. William F. Schultz (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania, 2007), 227-229. Henry Shue conceives
of a similar situation except that it involves a fanatic hiding a
nuclear bomb set to explode in the heart of Paris. For more on
Shue’s construction and his argument against torture from self
defense, see Henry Shue, “Torture,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 7
(1978): 124-143.
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over-all benefit than harm. In a previous section, I
discussed why this type of thinking is problematic.
Thus far, we have discussed the character of
rights in Dworkin’s system and one unacceptable
justification for infringing rights that is used in favor of
torture in limited circumstances. What about those
cases involving massive disasters? Dworkin disregards
this as a probable justification. “…This argument
ignores the primitive distinction between what may
happen and what will happen…We must…discount
the gravity of the evil threatened by the likelihood of
reaching that evil.”30 The speculative claim of massive
disaster is never certain, so it is not an acceptable
justification for infringing rights. However, certain
writers have misunderstood Dworkin’s position on
this matter. For example, Mirko Bagaric and Julie
Clarke describe Dworkin’s position as allowing rights
infringement in the case of massive disasters.31 The
passage they quote is not an instance where Dworkin
asserts this claim, but is instead one that simply states
an opposing view, which Dworkin argues against.

30

Dworkin, 195.
They write that “Dworkin accepts that it is correct for a
government to infringe on a right when it is necessary to protect a
more important right or to ward off ‘some grave threat to society,’”
(my emphasis). Mirko Bagaric and Julie Clark, Torture (New York:
State University of New York Press, 2007), 23-24.
31
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V. Torture as a Violation of Dworkin’s Fundamental
Abstract Right
To review, Dworkin argues that the
fundamental abstract right of equal concern and
respect generates certain negative claim-rights. By
negative claim-rights, he means strong negative duties
of non-interference or non-participation in activities
against a determinate individual or institution despite
even the strongest moral considerations. In this section
I want to argue that torture violates the fundamental
claim-right of equal concern and respect. As such, the
right not to be tortured should be included as one of
Dworkin’s derivable negative claim-rights.
Dworkin defines equal concern and respect
within a government-citizen context, but this
relationship could be broadened to include noncitizens. “Government must treat those whom it
governs with concern, that is, as human beings who
are capable of suffering and frustration, and with
respect, that is, as human beings who are capable of
forming and acting on intelligent conceptions of how
their lives should be lived.”32 Both concern and respect
as defined by Dworkin are absent in torture contexts.
The dissolution of concern for torture victims
begins when torturers are trained. Jessica Wolfendale
describes how elite military units use survival training
to teach trainees to first become desensitized to their

32

Dworkin,272.
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own suffering then to the suffering of others.33 This
desensitization is achieved by resistance training
laboratories, where trainees “undergo a highly realistic
re-creating of the experience of being captured and
interrogated by the enemy.”34 Examples of these recreation sequences include prolonged forced standing,
unbearable noise and blindfolding. In 1968, one Green
Beret described how he had been taught to ‘put a
bucket on people’s heads and bang on it.’35 After they
participate in the tortured role, the trainees play the
torturer which teaches them to “be desensitized to the
infliction of pain.”36
The discourse of professionalism also aids
trained torturers in disambiguating the violence they
propagate from its human receiver. Torturers envision
themselves as professionals performing the
unpleasant, but necessary, duties to protect their
nation from external threats.37 Thus, torturers measure
their success by how well they torture without
considering the possible reasons for resorting to
torture or the possible impact it has on their victims.38
Interrogators, like Sgt. Mark Hadsell, stationed at a
camp near Abu Ghraib praised the “special
33

Jessica Wolfendale, “Training Torturers: A Critique of the
“Ticking Bomb” Argument,” Social Theory and Practice 32 (2006):
275.
34
Ibid.
35
Rejalli, 362.
36
Wolfendale, 277.
37
Wolfendale, 278.
38
Wolfendale, 280.
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interrogational techniques [interrogators used] such as
sleep deprivation or loud music. They can’t take it.
Trust me it works,” they said.39
Respect for other human beings is also lost in
torture situations. This disrespect begins with the
profoundly unequal relationship propagated in torture
contexts. The dominator controls the situation
completely with little concern for the dominated’s
welfare. One only needs to look at pictures from Abu
Ghraib to recognize this inequality. Two smiling U.S.
military personnel stand behind a pyramid of naked
Iraqis. One soldier holds a leash attached to an
incapacitated, naked Iraqi lying helplessly on the floor.
This treatment is contrary to any vision of life formed
by a human being and violates a cornerstone of
Dworkin’s conception of respect.
In addition, this prolonged treatment affects
further life aspirations. The personalities of many
torture victims are drastically altered by their
experience. Instead of the extroverted and active
personality they once had, victims isolate themselves
and avoid contact with other people. This avoidance of
contact is due to the loss of confidence in other people.
They also experience anxiety, sleep disturbances and
nightmares and many activities, such as going to the
doctor and speaking with authorities, become difficult
due to their association to torture (e.g. the sight of
medical equipment, personnel in uniforms, etc.).40

39

Rejali, 509.
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To review, through the desensitization of pain
and discourse of professionalism surrounding torture,
torturers are trained to maximize, instead of avoid, the
suffering and frustrations of their victims, which
violates Dworkin’s right to equal concern. Torture is
also not associated with any human being’s conception
of their life and profoundly affects any future life
prospects for the worse, thus violating Dworkin’s right
to equal respect. Given these violations of the abstract
right to equal concern and respect, governments need
to be prohibited from using torture as an
interrogational method. So, the right not to be tortured
in interrogational procedures should be included as a
concrete negative claim-right derivable from this
abstract right to equal concern and respect in
Dworkin’s system.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that if Dworkin’s
abstract right to equal concern and respect generates
certain concrete negative claim-rights, then the right
not to be tortured should be included as one of these
generated rights. I explained how rights were
necessary in defeating appeals to utilitarianism which
could result in undesirable circumstances. I then
argued that the ticking-time bomb scenario should be

40

Lone Jacobson and Edith Montgomery, “Treatment of Victims
of Torture,” in The Phenomenon of Torture, ed. William F. Schultz
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 285-286.
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dismissed as justification for allowing torture given its
utilitarian thrust.
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